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WHY THE SEC FAILED: REGULATORS 
AGAINST REGULATION 
Norman S. Poser*
INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) marks its seventy-fifth birthday. The anniversary comes at a 
time when the reputation and effectiveness of the agency are at their lowest 
point in its history. This is especially sad because the SEC was known for 
years as one of the finest, if not the finest, of the federal regulatory 
agencies. Its effectiveness as the nation’s principal securities regulator was 
a source of pride to its members and its employees and a source of comfort 
to investors. Furthermore, it was thought to be incorruptible. Professor 
William L. Cary, SEC Chairman in the early 1960s, attributed the 
Commission’s success to the fact that “it does not give away property 
rights, and has not actually engaged in the fixing of rates. . . .  Nor is it an 
arbiter between competitors . . . .”1
Although Professor Cary’s observation is still largely true, the 
Commission has been corrupted in ways that he probably never envisioned. 
Two of the SEC’s most notorious failures came to light in 2008: the demise 
of several of the largest investment banking firms under its regulatory care 
and the SEC’s disregard of the warning signs that could have alerted it to 
Bernard Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme.
 
2
Ironically, there are close similarities between the state of the nation’s 
securities markets and economy at the present time and at the time of the 
SEC’s birth. In 1934, the country was in the worst depression in its history. 
 These are only the most 
recent results of a rot that set in several years earlier. Although several 
partial explanations have been given for the SEC’s decline, including 
budgetary problems and a fragmented regulatory system that has not kept 
up with developments in the financial markets, the main reason for the 
decline is that the Commission succumbed to the anti-regulatory climate of 
recent years. Too many of its members just did not believe in regulation. 
Other regulatory agencies also suffered from the same ill; but in view of the 
SEC’s former excellence, its decline is particularly lamentable. 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law Emeritus, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Poser served on the staff of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 to 1967 as a Senior Attorney on the Special 
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 1. WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
1967). 
 2. Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After Guilty Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2009, at A1. 
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Thirteen million people, representing 25 percent of the workforce, were 
unemployed.3 The Great Crash of 1929 and its aftermath, which wiped out 
83 percent of the value of the stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE or Exchange), was still fresh in people’s minds.4 True, in 
early 2009 the country’s financial and economic situation is not as bad as it 
was in 1934, but it is bad enough: the stock market has given up its gains of 
the previous ten years,5
The framers of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or 
Exchange Act)
 and the economy is sliding into a deepening 
recession, marked by sharply rising unemployment, foreclosures on homes, 
and a decline in corporate profits. 
6 saw a close connection between protecting investors and 
maintaining a healthy economy. The introductory section of the 1934 Act 
points out that “excessive speculation” affects the national welfare, with the 
result that “the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to 
burden the national credit.”7 Therefore, securities transactions “are affected 
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for 
regulation and control of such transactions.”8
                                                                                                                 
 3. FREDRICK E. HOSEN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 257 (McFarland & 
Co., Inc. 1992). 
 4. Id.; ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 245 
(Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1981). 
 5. In 2008 alone, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index fell by 38.5 percent. See E.S. Browning, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R1; see also Falling Backward: Stocks Finish 2008 Below Levels of 
10 Years Ago, available at http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJ_YE2008-LEDE.pdf. 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
 7. Exchange Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
 8. Exchange Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b. 
 Today, after a speculative 
binge in mortgage-backed securities has been followed by the collapse of 
several investment banking firms and the outpouring of government funds 
to save the economy from disaster, that statutory language seems eerily 
prophetic. 
In recent years, the SEC did not provide the regulation and control that 
might have prevented the worst results of the speculative binge of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. Its failures were of two kinds. First, 
succumbing to the deregulatory climate that pervaded the government since 
the 1980s, the SEC dismantled crucial parts of the regulation established to 
protect investors and the markets. Second, the SEC failed to detect and stop 
widespread abuses by securities firms, costing investors billions of dollars. 
This article will summarize the background of SEC regulation, describe 
the most important of the SEC’s regulatory and enforcement failures, 
attempt to ascertain the reasons for these failures, and recommend steps that 
should be taken to reverse the SEC’s decline. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The Exchange Act established the SEC to administer the federal 
securities laws.9 Its first chairman, Joseph Kennedy, was one of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s few business supporters when he ran for President in 1932. The 
appointment was not without its critics. One Cabinet member described 
Kennedy, who had participated in some of the manipulative pools of the 
1920s and early 1930s, as a notorious “stock market plunger.”10 Roosevelt 
answered the criticism by explaining: “Set a thief to catch a thief.”11 To the 
surprise of many, Kennedy turned out to be an effective chairman. He 
organized the Commission and brought in talented staff members, including 
two future Supreme Court Justices, William O. Douglas and Douglas’s 
assistant, Abe Fortas.12 A Yale Law School professor, Douglas was perhaps 
the country’s foremost legal authority on corporate finance. He was tough, 
brilliant, and politically astute. In 1937, Roosevelt appointed Douglas as 
SEC Chairman.13
Although his tenure lasted only nineteen months, Douglas made his 
mark on the Commission. He reorganized and simplified the structure of the 
country’s gas and electric utilities under the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935;
 
14 he began the regulation of the over-the-counter 
market through the creation of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD, now renamed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
or FINRA) under the Maloney Act of 1938;15 and he imposed standards of 
accounting and corporate finance on publicly-owned companies. It was 
during Douglas’s tenure that Richard Whitney, a former president of the 
NYSE, was caught embezzling from the NYSE’s fund for support of the 
widows and children of deceased stock exchange members.16 After SEC 
hearings revealed that prominent members of the Exchange had known 
about the thefts but had done nothing to stop them, Douglas used the 
Whitney scandal as an opportunity to reform the NYSE’s governing 
structure. He forced the Exchange to install a professional staff, headed by a 
full-time administrator; the system became permanent and spread to all 
other securities-industry self-regulatory organizations.17
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Exchange Act, § 4. From 1933 to 1934, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), which 
regulated distributions of securities, was administered by the Federal Trade Commission. With the 
enactment of the Exchange Act in 1934, this responsibility was moved to the SEC. 
 10. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 105 (The Maple 
Press Co., 2d ed. 1982). 
 11. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933–37, at 369 (Random House, Inc. 
1979). 
 12. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 111. 
 13. Id. at 110. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1938). 
 16. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 166–72 (1955). 
 17. Id. 
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When Douglas left the SEC to begin his long tenure on the Supreme 
Court,18 his successor was Jerome Frank, a judicial philosopher and ardent 
New Dealer who, like Douglas, was a passionate believer in the paramount 
goal of the securities laws: protecting investors.19 According to a 
contemporary report, when brokers, underwriters, and lawyers “grumble 
about red tape, . . . ambiguous rules, ‘arrogant & upstart personnel,’ . . . 
Chairman Frank thinks of the 10,000,000-odd trusting U.S. investors, 
resolves to guard them against needless shearing.”20
With the coming of World War II, the SEC became a less relevant and 
forceful agency. After Pearl Harbor, with the war to be won, the 
administration no longer regarded securities regulation as a priority. In early 
1942, the SEC was moved to Philadelphia to make room in Washington for 
government departments directly concerned with fighting the war. 
Surprisingly, the SEC was able to assist the war effort in at least one way: it 
helped the War Department plan bombing missions by reviewing old SEC 
filings of companies with factories in Germany in order to pinpoint their 
location.
 
21
Milton Freeman, a young SEC attorney, quickly drafted a short, simple 
rule prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 
 
Nevertheless, the SEC was relegated to the government’s backburner, 
where it remained for some time after the war. President Harry Truman had 
little interest in securities regulation and tended to appoint SEC 
commissioners who were cronies or persons to whom he owed political 
favors. The SEC was considered so unimportant that it was not brought 
back to Washington until 1948, three years after the war ended. 
Ironically, it was during the SEC’s Philadelphia exile that perhaps the 
most consequential event in the history of U.S. securities laws occurred. In 
May 1942, investigators at the SEC’s Regional Office in Boston learned 
that a company president was buying up shares from its shareholders 
without telling them of the company’s much improved earnings. The 
lawyers at the SEC’s Philadelphia headquarters could find no provision in 
the Exchange Act to stop the fraudulent purchase (as opposed to the sale) of 
securities. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was designed to outlaw fraud 
generally, but it could be used only if the SEC adopted a specific rule 
implementing it. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Douglas served on the Court from 1939 to 1975, longer than any other justice. See 
Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
 19. Frank was the author of Law and the Modern Mind (1930), a landmark of twentieth-
century legal thought, in which he analyzed law from a psychoanalytical perspective. After 
serving two years as SEC chairman, Frank was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 20. Intellectual on the Spot, TIME MAG., Mar. 11, 1940, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789708-6,00.html. 
 21. Interview by Richard Phillips with Milton Kroll, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 13, 2001), 
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/oralhistories/interviews/kroll.php. 
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He presented the rule to the five commissioners, who simply tossed the 
paper on the table, saying they were in favor of it. One member simply 
commented: “Well, we’re against fraud, aren’t we?” Before the sun set that 
day, Rule 10b-5 was the law of the land.22 In 1946, a federal district court 
held that a violation of Rule 10b-5 could be the basis for a private right of 
action.23 As a result, the rule, which the SEC adopted in an almost absent-
minded way when the war and not securities regulation was on most 
people’s minds, became the most important enforcement tool not only for 
the SEC but also for defrauded investors. The enormous body of law 
created by the SEC and the federal courts interpreting Rule 10b-5 is, as 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist aptly (though without enthusiasm) stated, 
“a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”24
The long sleep of the SEC during the 1940s and 1950s came to an end 
in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy appointed Columbia Law 
Professor William L. Cary as Chairman.  According to SEC historian Joel 
Seligman, Cary “revitalized” the agency.
 
25 Soon after his appointment, 
Cary obtained a special appropriation from Congress to establish the 
Special Study of Securities Markets (Special Study), a two-year in-depth 
review of the markets and their regulation. The report, issued by the Special 
Study in 1963, led to two key changes.26 First, legislation enacted in 1964 
required companies whose shares were traded in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market to make the same disclosures as exchange-listed 
companies.27 Markets thrive on information, so when information became 
available about OTC companies, the market exploded in size. Moreover, in 
1971, the NASD established the Nasdaq market, which developed into an 
electronic market for OTC stocks and eventually challenged the supremacy 
of the NYSE.28
Second, the Special Study found that the minimum rates of 
commissions that the NYSE and other exchanges required members to 
charge their customers were not only anticompetitive but were also 
routinely circumvented.
 
29
                                                                                                                 
 22. The story is told in Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium: Foreward, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 
(1993). The Administrative Procedure Act, which requires administrative agencies to publish 
proposed rules for comment before adopting them, was not in effect in 1942. 
 23. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 25. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at ch. 10. 
 26. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963). 
 27. Securities Amendments Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l). 
 28. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s National 
Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 894–95 (1981). 
 29. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963). 
 The SEC forced the exchanges to gradually phase 
out fixed commissions, and in 1975, all commission rates paid by customers 
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became subject to negotiation.30  The resulting drastic reduction in 
transaction costs, especially those paid by institutional investors, gave an 
even greater stimulus to the markets; the average daily volume of share 
trading on the NYSE rose more than one hundred-fold between 1975 and 
2008—from eighteen million to about two billion shares.31
Under the chairmanship of William Cary and his immediate successors, 
the SEC achieved other key enforcement and regulatory results. In the 1961 
case, In re Cady Roberts & Co.,
 
32 the SEC held for the first time that the 
use of non-public information in public securities markets on behalf of a 
brokerage firm or its customers violated Rule 10b-5. This seminal decision 
set the framework for all future insider-trading regulation. Following the 
reasoning of Cady Roberts, the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.,33
Using the authority given to it by the Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975, the Commission facilitated the creation of a national market for 
securities and the eventual automation of the securities markets.
 firmly established the Rule 10b-5 liability of corporate 
insiders for misuse of inside information. 
34 During 
the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the SEC sought to keep abreast of 
financial and technological developments by conducting studies and issuing 
detailed reports on the growth of institutional investors,35 the markets for 
put and call options,36 mutual fund regulation,37 and corporate disclosure 
requirements.38
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 898–901. The prohibition against fixing commission rates is Exch. Act § 6(e), 15 
U.S.C. § 78(f)(e). 
 31. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Euronext Announces Trading Volumes 
for December 2008 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1231412905832.html; 
New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, Daily Reported Share Volume, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/default.aspx?tabid=115. 
 32. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 33. See generally S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 34. Bowing to pressure from the NYSE, however, the SEC was unwilling to take the 
necessary regulatory steps that would have converted the NYSE’s trading system from face-to-
face trading on a trading floor into an electronic market. As a result, the U.S. securities markets 
lagged behind those of Europe in automation of securities trading. See Norman S. Poser, The 
Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 
22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 524–28 (2001). 
 35. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY OF THE SEC, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64 (1971). 
 36. 96TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1978). 
 37. 89TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT 
COMPANY GROWTH H.R. DOC. NO. 89-2337 (1966). 
 38. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICIES UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) (1969). See also Milton H. Cohen, 
Truth in Securities’ Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966). 
 The Commission adopted rule changes that integrated the 
disparate disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, thus 
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simplifying the disclosures and reducing the regulatory costs to 
companies.39
Beginning in the 1980s, the SEC largely abandoned its role as an active 
monitor of the markets.
 
40 Increasingly, it embraced the climate of 
deregulation that has since pervaded the government.41 The Commission’s 
main focus changed from protecting investors to protecting the companies 
and investment firms that the SEC was required to regulate. The SEC’s 
change of direction was given an air of legitimacy by Chicago-school 
laissez-faire scholars who argued, for example, that: (1) regulation of the 
markets was not needed and was even harmful because the markets were 
best left to regulate themselves, (2) mandatory corporate disclosure was 
unnecessary because the profit motive would give companies a sufficient 
incentive to make accurate disclosures,42 and (3) regulation of market 
manipulation was futile because manipulation is a myth.43 Others argued 
that the “moral hazards” that existed when commercial bankers engaged in 
investment banking were also a myth.44
                                                                                                                 
 39. For example, the SEC allowed seasoned companies to file short-form registration 
statements when making public offers of securities under the 1933 Act, which incorporated by 
reference the companies’ 1934 Act filings. It also adopted Regulations S-K, 17 CFR §229 (non-
financial information), and S-X, 17 CFR §210 (financial information), which mandate uniform 
disclosures to be used in 1933 Act registration statements offerings and 1934 Act annual reports 
and proxy statements. 
 40. Nevertheless, under the chairmanships of Arthur Levitt (1993–2001) and William 
Donaldson (2003–2005) the SEC did take important regulatory actions, including the adoption of 
Regulation FD (concerning corporate disclosure) and Regulation NMS (concerning the national 
market system). See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Historical Summary: Past 
Chairmen and Commissioners, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2009). 
 41. For example, the Food and Drug Administration has been criticized for similarly failing to 
protect consumers. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to 
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008); Jennifer Wolsing, The 
VIOXX Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Misdirected Tort Rules, 75 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 217 (2008); Cameron Rhudy, How Congress May Have Failed Consumers with the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 99 (2008). 
 42. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682–84 (1984) (“If disclosure is worthwhile to investors, the 
firm can profit by providing it.”). The Enron and WorldCom (and many other) corporate scandals 
that came to light in the early 2000s may have weakened the force of this argument. For a 
summary of the academic debate on the necessity for mandatory corporate disclosure, see COX, 
HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 253–57 (5th ed. 
2006). 
 43. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J.FIN. 343 
(1999) (arguing that the anti-manipulative provisions of the Exchange Act were enacted under a 
false assumption, because the stock pools of the 1920s and 1930s were not manipulative); Daniel 
R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991) (arguing that the concept of manipulation should be abandoned 
because manipulation cannot be satisfactorily defined). 
 44. See, e.g., FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 71 (1996) (“It is now widely accepted that Glass-Steagall restrictions are not necessary 
to maintain bank soundness or financial stability.”). 
 The latter argument questioned the 
basic premise of the Glass-Steagall Act, which mandated separation of these 
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two activities, and provided a theoretical basis for the gradual erosion of the 
Glass-Steagall Act and its ultimate repeal in 1999.45
II. WEAKENING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
 
Wall Street and corporate America welcomed anti-regulatory theory 
because it gave them a justification for the unfettered pursuit of profit, 
unburdened by fear of guilt or government prosecution. Their attitude was 
famously summed up by the fictional financier Gordon Gekko in the 1987 
movie Wall Street, who said “greed is good.” The catastrophic events of 
2007 and 2008 have, to say the least, cast a shadow of doubt over these 
ideas. 
During the past decade, the SEC made important regulatory changes 
that weakened the regulatory system and turned out to be a disaster for 
investors, significantly contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. First, the 
SEC exempted the largest investment banking firms from the minimum 
capital requirements imposed on broker-dealers.46 Second, the SEC 
repealed a rule designed to prevent manipulative short selling of 
securities.47 At the same time, the Commission’s other deregulatory actions 
included limiting shareholder access to the proxy voting system and 
repeatedly urging the Supreme Court to limit investors’ ability to recover 
their fraud losses by means of private lawsuits.48
                                                                                                                 
 45. Glass-Steagall is the name given to the National Banking Act of 1933. The Supreme Court 
discussed the moral hazards that led to the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 in some 
detail in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The revisionist theories that 
supported repeal of Glass-Steagall are reviewed in NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, 
BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §2.02, at 8–9 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
 46. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (2004). 
 47. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. 242.201 (2007); See Release No. 34-55970 
(2007). 
 48. The SEC made other deregulatory changes. In 1997, it reduced from two years to one year 
the time that a purchaser of securities in an unregistered private placement was required to hold 
the securities until they could be sold to the public. Revision of Holding Period Requirements in 
Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 62 FR 9242 (Feb. 20, 1997). In 2007, it 
reduced the required holding period to six months for securities of companies required to file 
periodic reports with the SEC. Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 
92 S.E.C. Docket 110 (Dec. 6, 2007). The purpose of the holding period is to ensure that the 
private placement is not simply a conduit for an unregistered (and therefore illegal) public offering 
of the securities. The SEC justified the changes by stating they would reduce the cost of capital, 
particularly for small business issuers. 
  In 2005, the SEC loosened the rules governing public offerings, permitting some 
companies to send investors publicity before the SEC had approved a registered offering for sale 
to the public. The SEC stated that the rules “will provide more timely investment information to 
investors without mandating delays in the offering process that we believe would be inconsistent 
with the needs of issuers for timely access to capital.” Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act 
Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,993, 70 FR 44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 These four deregulatory 
actions are discussed below. 
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A. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The SEC’s net capital rule limits the leverage that a firm can take on in 
its proprietary trading.49 It is designed to protect the customers and creditors 
of a brokerage firm from losses and delays that can occur when a firm fails. 
Because broker-dealers typically have many outstanding contracts with 
each other, the rule also provides essential protection for other brokerage 
firms and the markets as a whole. The rule, as it was adopted in 1942, gave 
an exemption from net capital requirements to member firms of stock 
exchanges that had net capital rules of their own.50 In 1975, after a financial 
crisis in which several large NYSE firms failed, Congress amended the 
Exchange Act to require the SEC to adopt minimum standards of financial 
responsibility that would apply to all broker-dealers, and as a result the 
SEC repealed the stock exchange exemption.51
The net capital rule defines a firm’s net capital as its net worth (assets 
minus liabilities) minus certain deductions from net worth (colloquially 
referred to as “haircuts”), in order to arrive at a figure that approximates the 
firm’s liquid net assets.
 
52  This is done by deducting from a firm’s net 
worth: (1) all assets that cannot be readily converted into cash; and (2) a 
percentage of the market value of the firm’s securities and other assets (to 
reflect the market risk of owning these instruments).53 This final figure 
approximates the firm’s liquid net assets.54 A broker-dealer must at all times 
have net capital that meets either one of two alternative tests:55 under the 
first test, its aggregate indebtedness may not exceed fifteen times its net 
capital; under the second (or alternative) test, its net capital must be at least 
two percent of its customer-related receivables, i.e., debt owed to the firm 
on margin accounts.56
In 2004, the SEC, with little publicity, effectively exempted the five 
largest broker-dealer firms from the net capital rule.
 Most large brokerage firms choose to be regulated 
under the alternative test, which provides an approximation of the firms’ 
securities business with the public. 
57
                                                                                                                 
  The pros and cons of these rule changes are not the issue. The point is that they were made 
principally in the interests of issuing corporations and insiders, and they removed protections for 
public investors. 
 49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008). 
 50. 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(b)(1)(2). 
 51. See Exchange Act §15(c)(3)(A), 17 U.S.C. §78o(c)(3)(A); Exchange Act Release No. 
11969 (Jan. 2, 1976). 
 52. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, at §12.02. 
 53. Id. at §12.02[A]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) (2008). 
 56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii). 
 Each of these firms 
 57. The firms were Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley. Two other firms with broker-dealer affiliates, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, 
were regulated by the Federal Reserve Board. SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT  NO. 
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was affiliated with an investment bank holding company (IBHC) that did 
business in Europe as well as the United States.58 In order to comply with a 
European Union requirement that bank-affiliated brokerage firms be 
regulated on a consolidated basis, the SEC amended the net capital rule to 
establish “a voluntary, alternative method of computing deductions to net 
capital for certain broker-dealers” that were part of consolidated supervised 
entities.59 Under the amended rule, an IBHC and its affiliated broker-dealer 
could elect to become a consolidated supervised entity (CSE) that would be 
supervised by the SEC under standards established by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.60 In return, the broker-dealer affiliate would be 
exempted from the net capital rule.61
The CSE program was enthusiastically greeted by the securities 
industry when the SEC first proposed it in 2003. The Securities Industry 
Association (SIA), the industry’s trade group, gushed: “While potentially 
reducing regulatory capital requirements, the proposal would require group-
wide adherence to rigorous risk-management practices and introduce 
commission supervision of such practices, thereby reinforcing the financial 
integrity of broker-dealers.”
 All five firms opted to become CSEs. 
62 The SEC, however, adopted the program 
quietly, without even a press release. In announcing the change at an open 
meeting of the Commission, Chairman William Donaldson said the SEC 
would move its supervisory programs “from a command-and-control 
regulatory model to a more efficient and goal-oriented approach . . . by 
removing regulatory obstacles that tilt the playing field or impose needless 
costs.”63
[I]f the 2004 net capital rule changes were not intended to be 
deregulatory, they worked out that way in practice. The ironic bottom line 
is that the SEC unintentionally deregulated by introducing an alternative 
net capital rule that it could not effectively monitor. . . . [A] team of only 
three SEC staffers were assigned to each CSE firm (and a total of only 13 
 
Having allowed the largest firms under its regulation to opt out of its 
key financial-responsibility rule, the SEC failed to monitor them. According 
to Professor John Coffee: 
                                                                                                                 
446-A, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED 
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM ix (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See generally Exch. Act Release No. 49,830 (June 8, 2004). 
 60. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides international standards and 
supervision for international banking. About the Basel Committee, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm. 
 61. See Kenneth Marx, The Ebb and Flow of the Purpose for Liquidity Under the New Capital 
Rule 20–23 (Fall 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 62. Broker-Dealers: SIA Welcomes Proposed CSE Framework, Allowance for Alternative 
Capital Standards, SECURITIES LAW DAILY, (Mar. 5, 2004). 
 63. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, S.E.C., Opening Statement at April 28, 2004 Open 
Meeting, (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042804whd.htm. 
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individuals comprised the SEC’s Office of Prudential Supervision and 
Risk Analysis that oversaw and conducted this monitoring effort).64
Virtually free of SEC regulation, the CSE firms took on enormous 
risks, using extreme leverage to invest in mortgage-backed securities and 
other exotic financial instruments. Their ratios of debt-to-equity ballooned: 
Merrill Lynch’s (Merrill) to 28–1; Morgan Stanley’s to 33–1.
 
65 The SEC 
“allowed such things as ‘hybrid capital instruments’ (much riskier than cash 
or Treasuries), subordinated debt (ditto) and even deferred return of taxes, 
to be counted as capital. The S.E.C. even allowed the banks to hold 
securities ‘for which there is no ready market’ as capital.”66 Furthermore, 
the SEC’s Inspector General later reported that the SEC staff “became 
aware of numerous potential red flags prior to Bear Stearns’ collapse, 
regarding its concentration of mortgage-backed securities, high leverage, 
shortcomings of risk management in mortgage-backed securities and lack of 
compliance . . . , but did not take actions to limit these risk factors.”67
The result of the SEC’s regulatory relaxation of the CSE firms, 
combined with its failure to monitor them, was devastating. When a steep 
drop in the housing market in 2007–2008 made many mortgage-backed 
securities worthless, the CSE firms were faced with multi-billion-dollar 
losses that threatened their viability or rendered them insolvent.
 
68 As a 
result, Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase (with emergency 
funding from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Lehman Brothers 
(Lehman) filed for bankruptcy protection, Merrill was acquired by Bank of 
America, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley transformed themselves 
into bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) as their 
new principal regulator.69
The SEC’s quietly adopted exemption of the CSE firms from the net 
capital rule and its failure to monitor them were contributing factors to the 
paralysis of the nation’s credit system and the deepening of the economic 
recession. The SEC announced the end of the CSE program in September 
2008.
 
70 SEC Chairman Christopher Cox admitted that the program was 
“fundamentally flawed because investment banks could opt in or out of 
supervision voluntarily.”71
                                                                                                                 
 64. John C. Coffee, Jr., Missing in Action? Meltdown Raises Doubts About SEC Regulation, 
N.Y.L.J. (2008). 
 65. See Marx, supra note 61, at 20–23. 
 66. Ben Stein, Wall Street, Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, § BU, at 1. 
 67. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57 at ix. 
 68. See id. at iv. 
 69. Id. at iv. 
 70. Press Release, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities 
Program, Release No. 2008-230 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2008/2008-230.htm. 
 71. Id. 
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B. SHORT SELLING 
A short sale is essentially a bet that the market for a security will 
decline. Short sellers sell shares they do not own; they borrow the shares in 
order to deliver them to the buyer, in the hope that they will be able to buy 
the shares later at a lower price and return them to the lender. Short selling 
is not in itself illegal or unethical, but it is a technique that can be used for 
manipulative purposes. By repeatedly selling a company’s shares short (and 
sometimes by simultaneously spreading negative rumors about the financial 
state of the company) short sellers can depress the share price. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, so-called “bear raiders” made a practice of using short selling 
for this purpose.72
The Exchange Act gave the SEC specific authority to regulate short 
selling.
 
73 In 1938, “after several years of considering the effect of short 
selling in a declining market,”74 the SEC adopted a short selling rule.75 The 
rule, known as the “tick test,” prohibited a short sale at a price that was 
either (1) below the last sale price or (2) at the last sale price if that price 
was below that last different sale price.76 For example, if the sequence of 
the last two sale prices was $9.95, $10.00, a short sale could not be made 
below $10.00; but if the sequence of the last two sale prices was $10.05, 
$10.00, a short sale could not be made below $10.05. Thus, short sellers 
could not move the price of a stock downward; they could sell short only in 
a rising market.77
In 2003, after the tick test rule had been in effect for sixty-five years, 
the SEC began considering its repeal. The Commission conducted a pilot 
program, in which the tick test was temporarily suspended.
 
78 The 
Commission’s Office of Economic Analysis concluded that the price 
restrictions of the tick test “do not appear necessary to prevent 
manipulation.”79
                                                                                                                 
 72. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 9; see also Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exch. Act 
Release No. 55970, 2007 WL 1880054, at n. 33 (June 28, 2007). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 74. S.E.C. Press Release No. 2007-114 (June 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-114.htm. 
 75. Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2006), removed and reversed by Regulation SHO and 
Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 2007). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Of course, even in a declining market there are upticks (i.e., sales above the last sale price) 
which give traders opportunities to make short sales, but the tick test limited their ability to force a 
rapid price decline. For a more detailed description of the short selling rule, see LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 865–66 (5th ed. 2004). 
 78. SEC Press Release No. 2007-114 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/207/2007-114.htm. 
 79. Id. The only academic who sent the SEC a comment on the proposed repeal of the tick test 
wholeheartedly supported it. See James J. Angel, Letter dated Feb. 14, 2007, Associate Professor 
of Finance at Georgetown University (“Eliminating the rule will remove an expensive compliance 
headache that produced no benefit for investors.”). 
 In 2007, “in order to modernize and simplify short sale 
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regulation,”80 the Commission decided not only to repeal the rule but also 
to prohibit any self-regulatory organization (SRO) from adopting or 
maintaining a tick test of its own.81 The NYSE, while supporting repeal of 
the rule, “noted its concern about unrestricted short selling during periods 
of unusually rapid and large market declines,” which had not happened 
during the period of the pilot study.82 The NYSE therefore suggested that 
SROs be permitted to impose price restrictions on short selling if 
necessary.83 The SEC rejected this suggestion and adopted the rule change 
as originally proposed.84
Investors have now been whipsawed by what appears to be manipulative 
trading, what we used to call ‘bear raids,’ which drive stock prices down 
without warning and at breakneck speed. . . . The SEC has an opportunity 
to make a real difference in helping to control future market stability and 
restore confidence in the fairness of our capital markets. But the SEC has 
been strangely silent as the crisis has worsened.
 
The folly of the SEC’s action was soon made clear. In the market crash 
of 2008, the conditions that led to adoption of the tick test returned, but 
without the protection of the rule. According to the head of one securities 
firm: 
85
Lehman, AIG and other financial institutions were destroyed by bear raids 
in which the shorting of stocks and buying of CDS [collateralized debt 
securities] amplified and reinforced each other. Unlimited shorting was 
made possible by the 2007 abolition of the uptick rule (which hindered 
bear raids by allowing short-selling only when prices were rising). The 
unlimited selling of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. Together, 
the two made a lethal combination.
 
The financier George Soros was even more critical: 
86
It took the bankruptcy of Lehman, a Wall Street firm founded in 1850, 
for the SEC to take any remedial action. After announcing a second-quarter 
loss of $2.8 billion in June 2008, the firm fought a running battle with short 
sellers, whom it accused of spreading rumors to drive down the price of the 
 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 
36,348, 36,348 (July 3, 2007). 
 81. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 
36,348, 36,348. 
 82. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 
36,348, 36,350. 
 83. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 
36,348, 36,350. 
 84. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 
36,348, 36,352. 
 85. Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 
2008, at A17. 
 86. George Soros, The Game Changer, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at 8. 
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company’s stock.87 In September 2008, Lehman announced additional huge 
losses and filed for bankruptcy, a step that is widely thought to have 
contributed to the crisis of confidence and the freezing of the credit 
markets, “forcing governments around the globe to take steps to try to calm 
panicked markets.”88 After Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, the SEC banned all 
short sales in financial stocks, a step that might not have been needed if the 
tick test had been in place in 2008.89
C. SHAREHOLDER PROXY ACCESS 
 
Because of the widespread ownership of corporate shares, voting of 
these shares is normally done by proxy.90 In the “belief that fair corporate 
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every corporate security 
bought on a public exchange,”91 Congress enacted Section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act,92 which authorizes the SEC to adopt rules governing the 
solicitation of proxies for corporate elections, if in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors. In 1942, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-8, which, 
with certain exceptions, permits a shareholder to place a proposal on the 
proxy ballot that corporate management sends to its shareholders to solicit 
their votes.93
One of the exceptions in Rule 14a-8 is a shareholder proposal that 
“relates to an election” for directors.
 Thus, a shareholder who has a proposal that is a proper subject 
for a shareholder vote can avoid the costly process of printing and 
distributing the shareholder’s own proxy materials. 
94 The exception limits access to the 
proxy with respect to the most significant right that shareholders in a 
publicly traded company possess: the right to elect the directors.95
                                                                                                                 
 87. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/ 
business/companies/lehman_brothers_holdings_inc/index.html (last visited May 19, 2009). 
 88. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., supra note 87. 
 89. SEC Press Release 2008-218 (Sept. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-218.htm. 
 90. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 529–30. 
 91. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 13). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. §78n(a). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008). 
 94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2008). 
 95. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 111 
(2d ed. 2004). Under state law, shareholders have no right to manage the business of a 
corporation. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §141; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §701; Helfman v. American 
Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (“In a purely business corporation . . . the 
authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be regarded as 
absolute when they act within the law.”). Typically, state law requires shareholders to approve 
major corporate changes, such as mergers and reorganizations. 
 
Nevertheless, almost universally, the proxy that management sends to 
shareholders contains a single slate of directors, and shareholders only have 
the choice of either voting for management’s slate or withholding their 
votes from one or more of the proposed directors. Rule 14a-8 does not 
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enable a shareholder to propose a non-management candidate, or slate of 
candidates, unless the shareholder is willing and able to launch an 
expensive proxy fight. The typical single-slate election is inconsistent with 
the “fair corporate suffrage”96
Although unrestricted shareholder access to the management proxy for 
the election of directors poses practical problems, with the growth of 
ownership of corporate shares by institutional investors, it may be feasible 
to allow limited access. In fact, in 2003, the SEC proposed a rule that would 
have allowed a shareholder or group of shareholders holding more than five 
percent of the voting shares to place a nominee on the management’s ballot, 
but only if the company had been unresponsive to shareholder concerns.
 purpose of Section 14(a). 
97
In 2006, an important issue arose concerning the definition of the 
exception for the election of directors. In American Federation of State, 
County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc. 
(AIG), the Second Circuit held that a shareholder proposal, not to submit a 
candidate’s name to be voted on for director but simply to amend a 
company’s bylaws to establish a procedure by which shareholder-
nominated candidates may be included on management’s ballot, did not 
“relate to an election” and therefore had to be included in management’s 
proxy.
  
Faced with fierce opposition from corporate management, the SEC shelved 
this relatively mild proposal. 
98 The court based its decision largely on the inconsistency of 
previous SEC staff “No Action” letters concerning the exact meaning of the 
exception.99
                                                                                                                 
 96. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934). 
 97. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26206, 81 SEC Docket 770 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
 98. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
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ground that the SEC previously took a contrary position. In Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to accept the SEC’s position as an 
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In October 2007, the SEC, by a 3–1 vote,100 broadened the exception to 
the shareholder proposal rule, thus overruling AIG. It amended the rule so 
as to provide that a shareholder proposal may be excluded if it “relates to a 
nomination or an election for membership on the company’s board of 
directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination 
or election.”101
As a result of the rule change, shareholders have neither the right to 
place their nominees on management’s ballot, nor the right to alter the 
voting system to give themselves greater access to the proxy process. 
Coming down firmly in favor of management and against public 
shareholders, the SEC stated that management may exclude shareholder 
proposals “requiring companies to include shareholder nominees for 
director . . . or otherwise resulting in a solicitation on behalf of shareholder 
nominees in opposition to management-chosen nominees.”
 Although the Commission claimed that the amendment was 
merely intended to clarify the “election of directors” exclusion, its effect 
has been a substantial diminution of shareholder rights. 
102
D. OPPOSITION TO PRIVATE LAWSUITS 
 
The SEC has repeatedly urged the Supreme Court to reduce the rights 
of investors in private lawsuits seeking recovery for securities fraud. In 
amicus curiae briefs, the SEC has used its influence to persuade the Court 
to require mandatory arbitration of customer-broker disputes, to give 
investment bankers immunity from antitrust liability, to tighten pleading 
requirements in securities fraud cases, and to dismiss investors’ claims on 
the ground of failure to prove causation. Furthermore, in one landmark 
case,103
SEC amicus curiae briefs have been influential in shaping the views of 
the Court on the complex issues it often faces in securities cases. In earlier 
years, the SEC used these briefs to support plaintiff investors, arguing that 
enforcement of the securities laws by investors is “a necessary supplement 
to Commission action.”
 several former SEC commissioners, some of whom represented 
companies with an actual or potential interest in the litigation, filed an 
amicus brief opposed to the interests of investors. 
104 In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. 
Berner,105
                                                                                                                 
 100. The vote was along party lines, the Republicans on the Commission voting in favor of the 
rule and the Democrats voting against. One Democratic seat was vacant at the time. Bryn R. 
Vaaler, SEC Permits Exclusion of Shareholder-Access Proposals, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, 
Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.dorsey.com/corporate_update_nov28_2007/. 
 101. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 
56914, SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). 
 104. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
 105. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985). 
 a 1985 securities fraud case involving the false “tipping” of non-
existent inside information, the Court expressly referred to the SEC’s 
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amicus brief supporting the plaintiff, stating: “The SEC has advised us that 
it ‘does not have the resources to police the industry sufficiently to ensure 
that false tipping does not occur or is consistently discovered’ . . . . Thus it 
is particularly important to permit ‘litigation among guilty parties.’”106 The 
SEC itself echoed this view in 1994 when it filed an amicus brief for the 
plaintiff with the Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver: “Private actions under Rule 10b-5 are an essential supplement to 
Commission enforcement of the Exchange Act, and the Commission has a 
strong interest in seeing that the principles applied in such actions promote 
the purposes of the securities laws.”107
Nevertheless, in recent years the Commission filed several amicus 
briefs in private securities suits urging the Court to interpret the securities 
laws narrowly and in contravention of investors’ interests. In 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the issue before the Court 
was whether an agreement between a customer and a brokerage firm to 
arbitrate any future dispute that might arise under the Exchange Act was 
enforceable.
 
108 The SEC’s amicus brief argued that the section of the 
Exchange Act that voids a waiver of compliance with any provision of the 
Exchange Act or SEC rules did not apply to a waiver of the right to have a 
dispute tried in a federal court, but only to substantive rights.109 The 
securities industry wanted mandatory arbitration of disputes with its 
customers because: (1) arbitration tends to be less expensive than litigation 
and (2) it believed that a panel selected in an industry-sponsored arbitration 
would be less likely than a federal jury to favor the investor. Mandatory 
arbitration could not have benefited investors, because the rules of the 
NYSE and NASD already required their members to arbitrate any customer 
dispute if the customer so desired. The Supreme Court held, by a 5–4 vote, 
that the arbitration agreement, which was on a standard printed form given 
to the customer to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, was enforceable.110
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 315–16. 
 107. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S 164 (1994) 
(No. 92-854) (the Court disagreed with the SEC and held for the defendant). 
 108. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987). 
 109. The anti-waiver provision is §29(a) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (2006). In 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court had held that an agreement to arbitrate a 
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Securities Act, it did not overrule Wilko, but two years later the Court formally overruled Wilko in 
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 110. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). The arbitration 
clause was in a standard-form contract. See id., Exhibit to the Record at 2541, 1853. 
 
The SEC’s brief may well have had a strong, if not decisive, influence on 
the Court’s decision. 
306 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
The SEC’s anti-investor stance in McMahon was unusual at the time, 
but during recent years the Commission has consistently filed, or 
participated in filing, amicus briefs with the Supreme Court on behalf of 
defendants in securities cases. 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,111 the question before the 
Court was what was necessary in order for a plaintiff to plead the requisite 
element of “loss causation” (i.e., that the defendant’s securities fraud caused 
the harm to the plaintiff) in a Rule 10b-5 suit. The suit was a class action, in 
which plaintiffs claimed that misrepresentations by the defendant 
corporation had led them to buy shares in the corporation. The Court, at the 
urging of the SEC, interpreted the loss causation requirement strictly. It 
held that a misrepresentation claim must be dismissed if it fails to allege 
that the defendant’s misrepresentations caused a disparity between the 
market price and the value of the stock at the time the plaintiffs bought the 
stock, even though the plaintiffs later sold the stock for a loss at a lower 
price.112 Yet, before a trial of the issues, it may be impossible for a plaintiff 
to allege sufficient facts to plead loss causation. The Dura decision has 
greatly increased the difficulty for plaintiffs in securities fraud suits to get 
past the pleading stage and have their cases heard by a jury.113
In Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
 
114 the Court, reversing the 
Seventh Circuit, strictly interpreted the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) provision that required a plaintiff in a securities fraud 
suit to plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of” 
the defendant’s scienter (scienter, i.e. intentional or reckless conduct, is a 
requisite element of a Rule 10b-5 claim).115 The Court held that, in order to 
decide whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to meet this requirement, 
the trial court must weigh all reasonable competing inferences, including 
those potentially negative to the plaintiff.116 Thus, the judge, before trial, 
must assume the role that a jury would normally perform, and dismiss the 
case if inferences negative to the plaintiff outweigh those that are positive 
to him. The government’s brief, which was signed by members of the 
SEC’s Office of General Counsel, supported this anti-investor interpretation 
of the PSLRA.117
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 Like the Dura decision, Tellabs restricts the ability of 
plaintiffs in securities fraud suits to get beyond the pleading stage and have 
their cases tried by a jury.  
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In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,118 the issue was 
whether investment banking firms that engage in anti-competitive practices 
in connection with initial public offerings (IPOs) of securities enjoy an 
implied immunity from liability under the antitrust laws. In earlier cases, 
the Supreme Court had been reluctant to imply immunity from antitrust 
liability on the ground that the actions complained of were governed by 
another federal regulatory scheme. The Court had held that such immunity 
exists only where anticompetitive actions in the securities area are 
necessary to make the Exchange Act work, and even then only to the extent 
necessary.119 In Billing, the practices complained of in the antitrust suit 
were alleged misconduct in IPOs that the SEC either had previously 
condemned or, in all likelihood, would not approve in the future.120 In 
response to a request by the Court, the SEC’s General Counsel gave an 
opinion that there was implied immunity from the antitrust laws.121 The 
Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, agreed with the SEC on the 
grounds that the case involved “(1) an area of conduct squarely within the 
heartland of securities regulations; (2) clear and adequate SEC authority to 
regulate; (3) active and ongoing agency regulation; and (4) a serious 
conflict between the antitrust and regulatory regimes.”122
The Supreme Court decision of recent years that, from a practical 
viewpoint, probably most restricted the ability of investors to recover 
damages from securities fraud was Stoneridge Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.
 The Billing 
decision broadened the scope of antitrust immunity beyond that established 
in previous Supreme Court cases and further limited investors’ ability to 
recover for harm done to them by brokerage firms. 
123 In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver, 
v. First Bank of Denver, that a private plaintiff could not maintain a suit 
against a person for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5, but could 
only sue primary violators of the rule.124
                                                                                                                 
 118. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Glen Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007). 
 119. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
 120. These practices are described below in text accompanying notes 148–51. 
 121. Letter Brief, at 7, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (Nos. 03-
9284 and 03-9288). 
 122. Credit Suisse Securities, 127 S.Ct. at 2397. 
 123. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). 
 124. Central Bank of Denver v. First Bank of Denver, 511 U.S 164, 191 (1994). 
 The question raised in Stoneridge 
was whether persons who knowingly participated in a fraudulent scheme, 
but made no acts or statements that the plaintiff relied on, could be regarded 
as primary violators (and therefore subject to possible liability under Rule 
10b-5) or only as aiders and abettors. The case was of the utmost 
importance because the decision was likely to affect the liability of the only 
persons from whom victims of massive corporate frauds such as Enron and 
WorldCom might recover their losses: secondary actors such as 
accountants, attorneys, and investment bankers. 
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The SEC did not file an amicus brief in Stoneridge, but a group of 
sixteen former SEC chairmen, commissioners, and general counsels, as well 
as eleven law professors, did file a brief arguing that secondary actors could 
not be primary violators of Rule 10b-5 unless they themselves made false 
statements on which the plaintiffs relied.125 In particular, the brief urged the 
Court to reject the plaintiffs’ theory of “scheme liability”: that a secondary 
actor who knowingly participates in a fraudulent scheme may be liable 
under Rule 10b-5 even if that person does not himself make a false public 
statement.126 The brief went further, arguing that to adopt the scheme 
liability theory would expand the right of action under Rule 10b-5, and that 
“[t]he days of judicially-implied private rights of action are long past.”127
It is possible that the signers of the brief were deluded by anti-
regulatory theory, but it is also possible that at least some of the signers 
were serving their own financial interests. What is most disturbing is that 
their brief did not disclose any of their existing affiliations or clients; they 
identified themselves only by their former positions at the SEC, which was 
 
The Court, affirming a decision of the Eighth Circuit by a 5–3 vote, adopted 
much of the reasoning in the amicus brief and held in favor of the 
defendants. 
The filing of this strongly anti-investor brief by a large group of former 
SEC chairmen and commissioners is a matter of some concern. For one 
thing, it indicates the extent to which laissez-faire “law and economics” 
theory has influenced academics and even regulators. Even so, it is 
surprising that a large number of former members and senior officials of the 
SEC should go out of their way to obtain a narrow interpretation of the 
Exchange Act that would defeat or hinder investors’ chances of recovery of 
losses due to securities fraud. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. The former SEC chairmen who signed the brief were Roderick M. Hills, Harvey L. Pitt 
(who had previously been General Counsel), and Harold M. Williams. The former commissioners 
were Charles C. Cox, Edward H. Fleischman, Stephen J. Friedman, Joseph A. Grundfest, Isaac C. 
Hunt, Jr., Roberta S. Karmel, Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Richard Y. Roberts, Laura S. Unger, and 
Steven Wallman. The former general counsels (in addition to Pitt) were James Doty and Simon 
M. Lorne. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 2–3, 24, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43). 
Former chairmen William H. Donaldson and Arthur Levitt and former commissioner Harvey 
Goldschmid (who had previously served as General Counsel) filed an amicus brief on behalf of 
the plaintiff. See id. 
 126. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and Finance Professors as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 15–16, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43). 
 127. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
24, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43). The 
question of whether there was an implied right of action for a violation Rule 10b-5 was not even 
before the Court, which had acknowledged that such a right existed on several previous occasions. 
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private right of 
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for 
more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”). See 
also Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
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the only reason their views would have had any significance to the Court. 
Several signers were partners in Washington law firms or consulting firms 
that represented publicly-held corporations, banks and broker-dealers—
entities that may well have had a potential financial interest in the outcome 
of the case.128 One of the signers was a partner in a law firm that advertised 
itself as a Washington lobbyist for corporate clients.129
The “revolving door” practice, under which SEC staff members may be 
tempted to “go easy” on enforcing securities laws because they have the 
prospect of high-paying Wall Street jobs, has been widely commented on 
(and will be discussed below), particularly in connection with the recent 
SEC enforcement failures.
 
130
III. ENFORCEMENT FAILURES 
 However, the potential evils of the revolving 
door also implicate members of the Commission. For a substantial number 
of these persons to use their prestige, acquired at least in part from their 
former positions as members (or general counsels) of the SEC, to urge the 
Supreme Court to interpret the securities laws in favor of their clients (and 
not in favor of investors), without any disclosure of their affiliations or the 
identity of their clients, is a measure of the distance that the SEC has 
traveled from its original mission of investor protection. It does not seem 
rash to predict that present members of the Commission will, after they 
reenter private life, similarly use their former positions to serve their 
corporate clients to the detriment of public investors. 
The Bernard Madoff scandal that came to light in December 2008 was 
only the latest of the SEC’s enforcement failures during the past decade. 
Unlike Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which apparently was a single huge fraud, 
many of the other situations involved abuses that were widespread in the 
securities industry. Since 2000, the SEC has failed to take timely and 
effective action to prevent abuses in connection with IPOs, tainted 
investment advice by research analysts at investment banking firms, late 
trading and market timing of mutual funds, and fraudulent sales of auction 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Edward H. Fleischman, a former commissioner, was counsel to Linklaters LP, a law firm 
that represents banks and investment companies, and specializes in advice to the world’s leading 
companies; Harvey L. Pitt, a former chairman, was the CEO of Kalorama Partners, LLC, a 
consultant to corporations; Steven Wallman,  a former commisisoner, was founder of FOLIOfn, a 
brokerage and investment company; Roderick M. Hills, a former chairman, was a founder and 
partner of Hills, Stern & Morley, a law firm that represents international finance corporations; 
James Doty, a former general counsel, was a partner in Baker Botts, a law firm that represents 
corporations and broker-dealers; Simon M. Lorne, a former general counsel, was vice chairman 
and chief legal officer of Millenium Management LLC, a hedge fund. 
 129. Richard Y. Roberts, a former commissioner, was a partner in Roberts, Raheb & Gradler, a 
law firm that advertises itself as a lobbyist for corporate clientele. 
 130. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Madoff Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A45. 
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rate securities. Investors have lost billions of dollars as a result of the SEC’s 
inability or unwillingness to fulfill its enforcement responsibilities.131
Ironically, in its own enforcement activities, the SEC has not met the 
standard of conduct that it requires of the broker-dealer firms it regulates.
 
132
We have repeatedly held that brokers and dealers are under a duty to 
supervise the actions of employees and that in large organizations it is 
especially imperative that the system of internal control be adequate and 
effective and that those in authority exercise the utmost vigilance 
whenever even a remote indication of irregularity reaches their 
attention.
 
On numerous occasions, the SEC has failed to detect abuses or has failed to 
take appropriate action despite the appearance of “red flags,” where similar 
conduct by a broker-dealer firm would have invited SEC disciplinary 
action. When imposing sanctions on brokerage firms for inadequate 
supervision, the SEC has stated: 
133
There must be adequate follow-up and review when a firm’s own 
procedures detect irregularities or unusual trading activity . . . .
 
134
A. ABUSES IN IPOS 
 
It appears that, far from monitoring the securities markets and securities 
industry in order to detect and terminate abusive and illegal practices, the 
SEC was prompted into action only after investigative financial reporters or 
state regulators had unearthed them. Congressional and internal 
investigations of SEC enforcement policies and procedures, prompted in 
part by the sensational Madoff case, may determine whether the 
Commission’s failure to enforce the securities law was a result of policy or 
ineffectiveness, or a combination of the two. In either case, the sheer 
number and size of its failures point to a systemic problem at the agency. 
In 2000, several industry-wide abuses by investment banking firms in 
the allocation of new issues of securities were exposed, largely through the 
work of investigative reporters at the Wall Street Journal (Journal). In the 
“hot issue” market of the late 1990s, obtaining an allocation of a new issue 
                                                                                                                 
 131. This partial listing of SEC enforcement failures does not include its failure to prevent 
widespread violations of law for protracted periods in the nation’s two principal stock markets. At 
the NYSE, between 1999 and 2006, all seven specialist firms denied investors the best prices by 
needlessly interpositioning themselves between public orders for their own profit. In the Nasdaq 
over-the-counter market, traders routinely rigged prices for several years during the 1990s. POSER 
& FANTO, supra note 45, at §4.01[D], 9–11. 
 132. Exch. Act §15(b)(4)(E) gives the SEC authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on 
broker-dealers that fail to exercise reasonable supervision over their personnel. 
 133. Reynolds & Co., Exchange Release No. 6273, 39 SEC 902, 917, 1960 WL 56264 (May 
25, 1960) (emphasis added). See also John H. Gutfreund, Exch. Act Release No. 31554, 1992 WL 
362753 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
 134. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Exch. Act Release No. 21813, 1985 WL 548567, at 
*7 (Mar. 5, 1985). 
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was extremely valuable. It was not uncommon for the price of a newly 
issued stock to rise by more than fifty percent during the first day of 
trading. In January 2000, the Journal reported that several Wall Street firms 
kept secret lists of institutional investors to whom the firms awarded new 
issue allocations in return for their brokerage business.135
Later that year and in 2001, the Journal published additional 
information about widespread abuses in the allocation process. They 
included: (1) “spinning,” i.e., allocating IPO stocks to the personal accounts 
of executives of companies in return for the companies’ investment banking 
business;
 Thus, even 
though an offering was ostensibly made to the public, a large proportion of 
the shares went to favored customers in return for a valuable consideration. 
136 (2) “laddering,” i.e., allocating IPO shares of a company on 
condition that the client buys additional shares of the company’s stock in 
the aftermarket;137 and (3) allocating IPO shares on condition that the client 
pay especially high commissions on unrelated brokerage transactions.138 
According to the SEC staff, laddering was an illegal manipulative device.139 
Spinning and charging excessive commissions may also have amounted to 
illegal kickbacks.140
In late 2000, the Journal reported that, according to a former SEC 
commissioner, the agency had discussed various questionable practices in 
the allocation of IPOs in the early 1990s, but it was not until 1997 that SEC 
 The effect of these practices was not only to 
manipulate the after-market prices of new issues but also to exclude the 
ordinary individual investor, who had nothing to offer the underwriter 
except ordinary commissions on his or her transactions, from allocations of 
public offerings of securities. 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Randall Smith & Suzanne McGee, Major Institutions, Led by Fidelity, Get Most of Hot 
IPOs, Lists Show, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000 at C1. 
 136. Terzah Ewing, NASD Would Bar Some Big Investors From All IPOs, Not Just the Hot 
Ones, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18 2000, at B2; Charles Gasparino et al., SEC Targets IPO Process With 
Probes — Latest Case Poses Challenge for Agency, But Solutions Exist, WALL ST. J., Dec 19, 
2000 at C1. 
 137. Susan Pulliam et al., Coming to Terms: CSFB Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle Twin 
IPO Investigations — Probes by SEC and NASD Grew Out of Conduct During Dot-Com Frenzy 
— A Legacy of Wheat’s Reign, WALL ST. J., Dec 11, 2001, at A1; Cassell Bryan-Low, Deals & 
Deal Makers: Latest IPO Boom: Number of Suits Alleging Abuses by Underwriters, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 29, 2001, at C12; Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, SEC’s IPO Inquiries Advance on Two 
Fronts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at C1. 
 138. Gasparino et al., supra note 136, at C1; Kathryn Kranhold, Deals & Deal Makers: SEC 
Intensifies Inquiry Into Commissions for Hot IPOs — Are Hefty Payments Business as Usual — 
Or Illegal Activity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at C1; Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, U.S. 
Probes Inflated Commissions for Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2000, at C1. 
 139. In August 2000, the SEC staff opined that laddering (a device designed to ensure a 
continued rise in the price of the stock) was a violation of the SEC’s anti-manipulative rules. SEC 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 10 (Aug. 25, 2000). 
 140. These practices were the basis for the investors’ claims in the Billing antitrust case, 
discussed above. They were also the subject of over 1,000 securities class actions brought by 
investors, which were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. See In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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enforcement officers began investigating possible spinning.141 “After the 
Journal’s ‘spinning’ disclosures, . . . the SEC’s enforcement division . . . 
launched full-blown investigations into the matter.”142
B. RESEARCH ANALYSTS 
 Thus, throughout the 
1990s, major investment banking firms were engaged in abusive practices 
without any intervention by the SEC, although the SEC had received 
warnings of those practices years earlier. 
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer 
announced the results of an investigation of conflicts of interest of research 
analysts at Merrill.143 The investigation showed that, from 1999 to 2001, 
Merrill did not publish a single “reduce” or “sell” recommendation on any 
stock in its Internet group. Furthermore, internal Merrill emails by analysts 
referred to some stocks that the firm was recommending to its customers as 
a “piece of junk,” a “piece of crap,” or in even more disparaging 
language.144
Two weeks after the NYAG’s announcement, the SEC announced that 
it was making an inquiry into the practices of research analysts at Merrill.
 The NYAG discovered that, unknown to the general public, 
Merrill’s research analysts were not giving impartial investment advice to 
their customers, rather, the advice was tailored to attract and keep the 
investment banking business of corporate clients. 
145 
Eventually, it became clear that the conflicts of interest of Merrill’s analysts 
were far from unique; the problem pervaded the securities industry. In April 
2003, the SEC, NYSE, NASD, NYAG, and several other state securities 
regulators announced the details of a “global settlement” with ten of the 
largest investment banking firms and two individual analysts.146 The 
settlement with the firms included monetary relief of $1.4 billion, including 
civil penalties and disgorgement of profits, as well as various procedural 
reforms.147
It does not appear that the SEC took any action in the research analyst 
scandal until the NYAG’s sensational announcement prompted it to act.
 
148
                                                                                                                 
 141. Gasparino et al., supra note 136, at C1. 
 142. Id. 
 143. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, §22.04[B], at 26–29, §22.04[C], at 30–34, §22.04[D], at 
34–38, §22.04[E], at 38–40, §22.04[F], at 40. 
 144. Id. at §22.04[B], at 22–27, §22.04[C]. 
 145. SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst Conflicts, Release No. 2002-56 (Apr. 25, 
2002). 
 146. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, at §22.04[C], at 30–34. 
 147. Id. at §22.04[C], at 22–30. 
 148. Id. at §22.04[B], at 26–29, §22.04[C], at 30–34, §22.04[D], at 34–38, §22.04[E], at 38–40, 
§22.04[F], at 40. 
 
For at least two years, the largest broker-dealer firms made a practice of 
betraying their customers by publishing tainted research reports, apparently 
without the SEC noticing. 
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C. LATE TRADING AND MARKET TIMING 
In September 2003, NYAG Spitzer announced that his office had 
obtained evidence of “widespread illegal trading schemes that potentially 
cost mutual fund shareholders billions of dollars.”149 These schemes 
consisted of “late trading” and “market timing” of mutual funds.150 The 
NYAG simultaneously announced that it had reached a $40 million 
settlement with a hedge fund and its managing principal on charges 
involving these abuses.151
Late trading is a violation of SEC Rule 22c-1 under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, which requires “forward pricing” of mutual fund 
shares.
 
152 Forward pricing means that the purchaser (or seller) of a mutual 
fund pays (or receives) a price that is based on the net asset value of the 
fund at the close of the market (4:00 p.m. Eastern Time) following the 
purchase.153 Late trading involves the purchase or sale of fund shares after 
the market closes, at a price that has already been set, allowing the trader to 
take advantage of post-closing events that are not reflected in the net asset 
value of the fund.154 According to the NYAG, “[a]llowing late trading is 
like allowing betting on a horse race after the horses have crossed the finish 
line.”155
Market timing involves short-term trading of mutual fund shares. 
Additionally, in the case of funds that invest in foreign shares, it may be 
used to take advantage of time-zone differences. The practice is not illegal; 
in fact, the SEC staff had earlier been opposed to restricting short-term 
trading in mutual funds because the restriction would have limited 
investors’ right to redeem their shares; as a result, in 2000, the SEC did not 
take a position when some market timers sued fund companies for trying to 
restrict their trading.
 
156 Nonetheless, a mutual fund prospectus that states 
that the fund does not permit short-term trading may be misleading if the 
fund company does permit certain traders to trade short-term. Furthermore, 
a broker-dealer or investor who falsifies his or her identity to engage in 
trading not permitted by the fund company may be committing fraud.157
                                                                                                                 
 149. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Attorney General Spitzer and Securities and 
Exchange Commission File Charges Against Bank of America Broker (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter 
Sept. 2003 Press Release, Attorney General Spitzer]. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. The announcement of the settlement stated that the hedge fund and its managers agreed 
to make restitution of $30 million in illegal profits and pay a $10 million penalty. 
 152. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2009). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Marcia Vickers, How Eliot Spitzer Makes the SEC Look Stodgy, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_37/b3849047.htm. 
 155. Sept. 2003 Press Release, Attorney General Spitzer, supra note 149. 
 156. This information was given to the author by David Silver, a former president of the 
Investment Company Institute, the trade association of the mutual fund industry. 
 157. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F.Supp.2d 845 (D. Md. 2005). 
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Subsequent investigations by the NYAG and the SEC revealed that 
several hedge funds and other investors, assisted by brokerage firms and, in 
some cases, by mutual fund companies, had engaged in late trading and 
market timing for years. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the SEC made 
regular examinations of mutual fund companies during the period in 
question, it never brought an enforcement action against any broker-dealer, 
mutual fund company, hedge fund, or any other investor based on either of 
these practices before the NYAG’s announcement in September 2003. 
D. AUCTION RATE SECURITIES (ARS) 
ARS are long-term bonds or preferred stock whose interest rates or 
dividends are reset by auctions that typically occur at intervals of between 
seven and thirty-five days. These auctions provide the primary source of 
liquidity for investors who wish to sell their investments.  Investors who 
buy ARS typically seek a cash-like investment that pays a higher yield than 
a money market fund or certificate of deposit.158
During recent years, billions of dollars of ARS were sold to investors 
by major brokerage houses as cash alternatives. In February 2008, the ARS 
market collapsed, with the result that investors were left holding illiquid 
securities.
 
159  In June 2008, William F. Galvin, Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, brought a civil action against UBS 
Securities, LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc. (together, UBS), charging 
that UBS had sold ARS to customers with false representations that they 
were liquid, safe, money-market instruments that could be sold at the next 
auction, whereas “no true auction existed for many of these securities.”160 A 
month later, NYAG Andrew Cuomo announced his own lawsuit against 
UBS, charging that “UBS customers are holding more than $25 billion in 
illiquid, long-term paper as a result of UBS’s fraudulent misrepresentations 
and illegal conduct.”161 On July 31, the Massachusetts regulator, Secretary 
of the Commonwealth William Galvin, brought a similar action against 
Merrill;162
                                                                                                                 
 158. FINRA Investor Alert, Auction Rate Securities: What Happens When Auctions Fail, 
http://www.finra.org/investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/PO38207 (last visited Feb. 
4, 2009). 
 159.  Id.  
 160. Administrative Complaint, In the Matter of UBS Securities, LLC & UBS Financial 
Services, Inc., Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., No. 2008-0058 (June 26, 
2008). 
 161. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo brings National Multi-
Billion Dollar Lawsuit Against UBS for Auction Rate Securities Scandal (July 24, 2008). 
 162. Administrative Complaint, In the Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., No. 2008-0058 (July 31, 2008). 
 and on August 7, the NYAG announced a settlement with 
Citigroup under which the company would fully reimburse 40,000 
customers who had been unable to sell their ARS since February 12, 2008, 
and pay civil penalties of $50 million each to the NYAG and the North 
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American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).163  On August 
11, the NYAG announced that it was expanding its investigation to 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wachovia.164
Until August 7, 2008, the SEC took no public action with respect to the 
ARS mess. However, on that day, the SEC enforcement chief announced a 
preliminary settlement with Citigroup compatible with the agreements 
already reached with the NYAG and NASAA.
 
165
where hundreds of thousands of ordinary investors were stuffed with 
impossible-to-sell bonds they thought were the equivalent of cash – it has 
been Andrew Cuomo, the combative attorney-general of New York State, 
who has wrung restitution out of brokers thanks to his legal threats, rather 
than the SEC.
  It is disturbing enough 
that: 
166
E. THE MADOFF SCANDAL 
 
It is at least equally disturbing that, before the ARS market collapsed in 
February 2008, several of the largest brokerage firms were selling many 
billions of dollars of securities to their customers throughout the country by 
means of misrepresentations as to the nature of these securities, while the 
SEC was either unaware of this practice or, if it was aware, took no action 
to stop it. 
On December 11, 2008, the SEC charged Bernard Madoff and his 
investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with 
perpetrating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme on advisory clients of the 
firm.167 In view of the fact that the SEC had apparently not detected four 
previous industry-wide multi-billion dollar frauds during the past eight 
years until the frauds were pointed out to it by state regulators or the 
financial press, it does not seem surprising that the Commission missed this 
one. In the Madoff case, the SEC ignored repeated warnings and filed a 
complaint in federal court only after Madoff’s own sons turned him in and 
he voluntarily admitted to the SEC staff that his investment advisory 
business was “all just one big lie . . . basically a giant Ponzi scheme.”168
                                                                                                                 
 163. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark 
Settlement with Citigroup to Recover Billions in Auction Rate Securities for Investors Nationwide 
(Aug. 7, 2008). 
 164. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Expands Investigation into 
Auction Rate Securities Scandal (Aug. 11, 2008). 
 165. Speech by SEC Staff: Statement at News Conference Announcing Citigroup Preliminary 
Settlement (Aug. 7, 2008). 
 166. Stephen Foley, How Wall Street’s Watchdog May Be Muzzled, THE INDEPENDENT 
(London), Aug. 15, 2008. 
 167. Press Release, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme, 
Release No. 2008-293 (Dec. 11, 2008). 
 168. Id. 
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According to the SEC, Madoff estimated that the losses from his fraud were 
at least $50 billion.169
What was surprising was SEC Chairman Christopher Cox’s reaction to 
the Commission’s failure. He publicly attacked the SEC staff. A former 
SEC Special Counsel described the attack as “throwing the agency’s 
enforcement staff ‘under the bus’ to deflect blame for his own leadership 
failures.”
 
170
Our initial findings have been deeply troubling. The Commission has 
learned that credible and specific allegations regarding Mr. Madoff’s 
financial wrongdoing, going back to at least 1999, were repeatedly 
brought to the attention of SEC staff, but were never recommended to the 
Commission for action. I am gravely concerned by the apparent multiple 
failures over at least a decade to thoroughly investigate these allegations 
or at any point to seek formal authority to pursue them.
 Five days after announcing the charges against Madoff, 
Chairman Cox issued a press release: 
171
Nowhere in the press release was there any suggestion that the 
Commission itself might have been at fault or that the Chairman and the 
four other Commissioners bore some responsibility for what had gone 
wrong. Again, it may be helpful to analogize the Commission’s 
responsibility to supervise its staff to the obligation that the SEC places on 
the senior management of brokerage firms. According to the SEC in one 
enforcement action: “[R]esponsibility for the supervisory function of a 
registered broker-dealer is incumbent upon the most senior members of 
management. Senior management has a duty not only to provide a 
meaningful supervisory structure, but also to actively monitor and enforce 
it.”
 
172
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. See also Joanna Chung, Prosecutor Reveals $1m Details of Madoff’s Jewellery Mailing 
List, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at 1 (“Mr. Madoff’s sons alerted prosecutors last week that they 
had received jewellery in the mail from their father. Mr. Madoff’s alleged fraud came to light last 
month when they turned him in.”). 
 170. Joanna Chung & Greg Farrell, SEC Under Pressure on Failed Detection, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2008, at 16. 
 171. Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding Madoff Investigation 2008-297 (Dec. 16, 2008).  
According to one report in the financial press, the SEC’s investigatory interest in Madoff goes 
back to at least 1992, as the result of a confidential tip that three small firms raising money 
exclusively for Madoff were promising annual returns of up to 20 percent. The SEC shut down 
the firms for selling unregistered shares, but the investigation raised no red flags as to Madoff’s 
operations. Peter Burrows, How Madoff is Burning the SEC, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2009, 
(Magazine), at 24, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_02/ 
b4115024163467.htm?chan=magazine+channel_news. In January 2009, the SEC’s inspector 
general told a congressional committee that his office had begun an investigation into the 
agency’s failure to uncover the alleged Ponzi scheme. Alex Berenson, Bid to Revoke Madoff’s 
Bail Cites His Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/business/06madoff.html?_r=1&partner=MOREOVERNEW
S&ei=5040. 
 In another such case, the SEC stated: “Establishment of policies and 
 172. Signal Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43350, 2000 WL 1423891, at *8 (Sept. 26, 
2000). Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E) expressly imposes on broker-dealer firms a duty to supervise, 
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procedures alone is not sufficient to discharge supervisory responsibility. It 
is also necessary to implement measures to monitor compliance with those 
policies and procedures.”173
Furthermore, the SEC has emphasized the importance of a broker-
dealer firm making internal audits of its branch offices and then acting on 
any potential or actual problems identified in the audit reports.
 
174 The fact 
that the SEC’s enforcement staff had failed to uncover several massive 
frauds in the recent past should have made it clear to the Commission that it 
needed a supervisory program to monitor its examiners and investigators to 
make sure they were doing their job, including to determine whether the 
Commission was alerted to red flags indicating possible misconduct.175
IV. WHY THE SEC FAILED 
 If 
the SEC had itself followed the precepts that it laid down for broker-
dealers, it might have detected the Madoff fraud many years earlier and 
saved investors billions of dollars of losses. 
A. REGULATORS AGAINST REGULATION 
The financial debacle of 2008 and the Madoff scandal have generated 
criticism of the SEC’s performance and several explanations for the 
agency’s failures. The explanations include conflicts of interest of the staff, 
lack of staff training, budgetary restraints, and the fragmented nature of the 
regulatory system. The fundamental reason for the failures, however, is the 
anti-regulatory climate, supported by academically generated anti-
regulatory theory, that has pervaded government (including the SEC) in the 
past two or three decades. The SEC’s main focus has changed from 
protecting investors to protecting the companies and investment firms that 
the SEC is required to regulate. As two knowledgeable observers recently 
wrote: “Created to protect investors from financial predators, the 
                                                                                                                 
and §15(b)(6)(A) extends that duty to individuals in the firm who have supervisory 
responsibilities. 
 173. Speer, Leeds & Kellogg, L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 48199, 2003 WL 21688753, at 
*7 (July 21, 2003). 
 174. See ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Broker-Dealer Supervision of 
Registered Representative and Branch Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1369–75 (1989); 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-26766, 1989 WL 257097 (Apr. 28, 
1989). 
 175. In the Madoff case, Harry Markopolous, a former money manager turned fraud 
investigator, testified before a congressional committee that the SEC had ignored twenty-nine red 
flags pointing to Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme that he had brought to the agency’s attention 
over a period of nine years. Joanna Chung & Brooke Masters, SEC Staff Ineptitude to Blame in 
Madoff Affair, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at 13. 
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commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting 
financial predators with political clout from investors.”176
The shift is evidenced by the anti-investor positions that the SEC (as 
well as a number of former commissioners) has taken in the Supreme Court 
amicus briefs described above. It can also be seen in public statements 
made by several SEC commissioners, which show a fundamental change in 
the way the SEC regards the purposes of the securities laws. From the time 
that the Exchange Act was enacted until about the late 1970s, it was 
generally accepted that curbing fraud and manipulation not only protected 
investors but also was good for the health of the economy. As the Supreme 
Court stated in 1979, “investor protection was [not] the sole purpose of the 
Securities Act. . . . Indeed, Congress’ primary contemplation was that 
regulation of the securities markets might help set the economy on the road 
to recovery.”
 
177
to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, 
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place 
adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest 
enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition 
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked 
promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his 
ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of 
industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of 
hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and 
consuming power.
 In the eyes of Congress, the aim of the Exchange Act was: 
178
This is not the view that has prevailed at the SEC during recent years. 
Instead, several commissioners have made it clear that they see regulation 
not as part of the essential infrastructure of the economy but rather as a 
restraint on it. Their public utterances have sent a not-too-subtle message to 
Wall Street and corporate management that the SEC is not inclined to take 
its regulatory tasks too seriously.  In 2004, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins 
told the Securities Traders Association that “the government’s intrusive 
involvement in the markets during the Great Depression” prolonged the 
Depression, and “Wall Street became the easy scapegoat for the economic 
 
Thus, in the eyes of Congress and the Supreme Court, effective regulation 
of the securities markets would contribute to, not detract from, economic 
growth. 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World As We Know It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/ 
04lewiseinhorn.html. 
 177. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (citing S. Rep. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1933)). 
 178. Id. 
2009] Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation 319 
deterioration within the United States.”179 The following year, SEC 
Chairman Christopher Cox, speaking to the Economic Club, quoted 
approvingly a statement by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan that “the best 
investor protection is a growing economy and a rising market” and added: 
“[A]ll that the SEC does – or should be doing for our country – is meant to 
help create and sustain an environment that promotes economic growth. . . . 
In other words, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”180 Thus did Chairman Cox 
encapsulate the Commission’s apparent policy of doing nothing until a 
massive fraud is brought to its attention by someone else. And in 2006, 
Commissioner Atkins told the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform: 
“[W]e must not allow the American economy to be encumbered by a web of 
excessive regulations that fail the cost/benefit test.”181 As yet another 
example, Commissioner Kathleen Casey has publicly expressed 
disagreement with the long-standing court decisions giving defrauded 
investors an implied right of action under Rule 10b-5.182
In speeches to industry groups, SEC commissioners listed capital 
formation as one part of a tripartite mission of the agency, the other two 
parts being investor protection and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets.
 
183
B. STAFF ISSUES 
 If investor protection is just one of three independent goals of 
the SEC, it is easy to take the next step and conclude that regulation should 
be reduced in order to promote capital formation. That view is inconsistent 
with the underlying philosophy of the Exchange Act: that prevention of 
fraud, maintaining of fair and orderly markets, and assurance of honest 
corporate disclosure are the essential underpinnings of capital formation. 
The so-called “revolving door” between employment at the SEC and 
the private sector has been cited as a reason why SEC staff members do not 
pursue investigations of possible misconduct with greater vigor. The theory 
is that staff members see their time at the Commission as a stopping-off 
place before accepting a much higher paying job at a Wall Street firm, and 
that, because they want to maintain good relations with Wall Street, they 
are not diligent as investigators or examiners.184
                                                                                                                 
 179. Speech by SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins before the Securities Traders Association 
(Oct. 7, 2004), at 1–32. 
 180. Speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox before the Economic Club (Dec. 12, 2005), at 
3. 
 181. Speech by Commissioner Paul S. Atkins before the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform (Feb. 16, 2006), at 1. 
 182. Speech by SEC Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey before the Institute for Legal Reform’s 
Legal Reform Summit (Oct. 24, 2007), at 7 (“I believe it is the role of Congress, not the courts, to 
decide whether a private right of action against third parties exists”). 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
 The enormous rise in Wall 
 184. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 176, at 9 (“If you work for the enforcement division of 
the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain 
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Street compensation during the past few years has increased that negative 
incentive.185
delays in the investigation, disclosure of sensitive case information by 
high-level SEC officials to lawyers for those under scrutiny, a detrimental 
narrowing of its scope after a meeting with a Pequot lawyer, and the 
appearance of ‘undue deference’ to a prominent Wall Street executive that 
resulted in the postponement of his interview until after the case’s statute 
of limitations had expired.
 This is supported by the Senate report into a failed SEC 
investigation of possible insider trading by Pequot Capital Management, 
which found: 
186
The findings of the Pequot report suggest the possible exercise of 
political influence on senior SEC officials, but do not necessarily point to a 
systemic problem of deference to Wall Street by SEC staff members. A 
more plausible reason for the high turnover rate is that large salaries in the 
private sector have been an almost irresistible lure to young professionals, 
particularly those with large student loans.
 
187 One result is that SEC 
investigators and examiners do not stay long enough to be properly trained 
and to acquire the experience necessary to understand complex financial 
instruments and make discerning judgments as to whether a given 
investigative lead should be pursued or dropped.188
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 185. See Krugman, supra note 130, at A45 (“The incomes of the richest Americans have 
exploded over the past generation, even as wages have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a 
major cause of that divergence.”). 
 186. Gretchen Morgenson & Walt Bogdanich, Report Says S.E.C. Erred on Pequot, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007 at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/business/ 
22hedge.html. The report by the Senate Finance and Judiciary committees was prompted by an 
accusation that Gary J. Aguirre, a SEC staff member, had been fired in order to prevent him from 
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Street executive and major fund-raiser for President Bush’s 2004 campaign had been given special 
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Morgenson, S.E.C. Inquiry on Hedge Fund Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006. 
 187. A former SEC examiner wrote: “The revolving door there is the biggest problem. Many 
staff members who are ambitious and competent quit to pursue jobs in the financial industry that 
pay multiple times their former government salaries.”  Eric W. Bright, Letter to the Editor, It Isn’t 
Surprising That SEC Missed Madoff’s Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2008, at A12. 
 188. According to William J. Brodsky, CEO of the Chicago Board Options Exchange and a 
former senior officer of the American Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
financial illiteracy among SEC staff made it easier for Mr. Madoff’s alleged fraud to go 
undetected. “The people doing the examinations have no clue what the right questions are to ask,” 
Mr. Brodsky told a reporter. Joanna Chung et al., French Madoff Investor Found Dead, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at 1. 
 
Another problem, related perhaps to the shortage of training and 
experience of staff members, is that SEC enforcement officers have an 
incentive to rack up a large number of “successes” by bringing easy cases, 
which the firm, or individual, is likely to settle and which do not require a 
lengthy investigation or an understanding of complex securities. 
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C. BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS 
Lack of resources is another frequently cited reason for the SEC’s 
failure to detect large frauds. The number of employees in the SEC’s 
enforcement division actually decreased between 2005 and 2007—from 
1,338 to 1,192; and the number of examiners has not increased since 2002, 
even though the number of investment advisors increased by 50 percent 
during this period.189
Whether or not the SEC has sufficient resources is not clear. Between 
2000 and 2008, the agency’s budget increased by 140 percent, from $377 
million to $906 million; but the number of staff positions increased by only 
20 percent, from 3,235 to 3,868.
 
190
Two points are relevant here. First, the SEC collects more in fees each 
year than it is appropriated by Congress. In 2008, for example, the agency 
collected $1.15 billion in fees, $209 million more than its budget.
 Even if inflation of salaries is taken into 
account, the SEC received a very substantial increase in funding during this 
period. 
191 The 
fact that corporations and Wall Street firms, not taxpayers, pay for 
securities regulation would argue for increasing the budget, while making 
sure that the SEC’s resources are properly used. Arthur Levitt, SEC 
Chairman during the Clinton administration, believes that the SEC’s 
“leadership must identify the biggest possible risks to investors and to the 
entire system and focus resources on these areas.”192
Second, it is clear that no matter how much money is appropriated, the 
SEC will never have enough resources to adequately protect investors 
against fraud, manipulation, and inadequate or inaccurate corporate 
disclosure. Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized this, stating 
that private enforcement of the securities laws “provides a necessary 
supplement to Commission action.”
 
193
D. FRAGMENTED REGULATION 
 Although in recent years the Court, 
on the whole, has not been friendly to the implied right of action, it has, on 
several occasions, reaffirmed that a private right exists under Rule 10b-5. It 
is sound policy, as well as morally right, for the SEC, in its public 
utterances and in arguing before the federal courts, to support private 
litigants asserting their rights under the securities laws. These suits provide 
essential help to the SEC in its enforcement activities. 
Yet another reason often given for the SEC’s ineffectiveness is that, 
unlike in most countries, financial regulation in the United States is 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Chung & Farrell, supra note 170, at 16; Arthur Levitt, Jr., How the SEC Can Prevent 
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fragmented. Securities transactions are regulated by the SEC; commodities 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); banks by three 
federal agencies: the FRB, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation; and insurance by state regulators. 
There is little rationale for this complex division of regulatory 
responsibility, particularly because some kinds of financial instruments do 
not fall neatly into one category: for example, variable annuities are both 
insurance policies and securities; futures on foreign currencies are regulated 
by the CFTC and options on foreign currencies by the SEC, although 
traders use both kinds of instruments for similar purposes of hedging and 
speculation.194
The SEC’s internal structure is similarly fragmented and has not kept 
pace with changes in the markets. Its three traditional operating divisions, 
Investment Management, Trading and Markets, and Corporation Finance, 
organized along the lines of the three major federal securities statutes, 
remain isolated from each other. They report to the five-member 
Commission, “which has no real coordinating and integrating facilities of 
its own.”
 Indeed, some financial instruments, such as non-
standardized credit default swaps (which have added greatly to systemic 
risk during the credit crisis), are not regulated at all. 
195
In March 2008, following disclosure of the enormous losses suffered by 
several of the largest brokerage firms from investments backed by defaulted 
mortgages, the Treasury Department issued a report containing a 
“Blueprint” for regulatory reform.
 
196 The Treasury proposed that financial 
institutions be regulated by four federal agencies: (1) the FRB, which would 
be responsible for overall conditions of financial market stability that could 
affect the economy; (2) a newly established Prudential Financial Regulatory 
Agency, which would impose requirements of capital adequacy, risk 
management and the like; (3) a newly established Conduct of Business 
Regulatory Agency, which would be responsible for business conduct 
across all types of financial firms; and (4) the SEC, which would continue 
to be responsible for corporate oversight in public securities markets, 
including corporate disclosures, corporate governance, and accounting and 
auditing oversight.197
The Treasury Blueprint of course does not solve the problem of 
regulatory fragmentation; it simply fragments regulatory responsibility in a 
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new way. Although it is not at all clear that the recommendations of the 
Blueprint will be implemented, the fact that they were made at all is 
significant. A year before the SEC’s seventy-fifth birthday, the Treasury 
Department proposed that the agency be stripped of most of its regulatory 
responsibility, including all authority over the business conduct and 
financial responsibility of brokerage firms. But for the low esteem into 
which the agency had sunk, even before the demise of several huge 
investment banks and the revelation of the Madoff Ponzi scheme, it was 
inconceivable that such a proposal would have been made at all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have tried in this article to summarize the history of the SEC, to 
pinpoint its principal failures, and to suggest the reasons for the failures. 
Although factors such as insufficient resources and inadequate training of 
staff members may have played a part in the Commission’s decline, the 
main reason, in my opinion, is the ethos of deregulation that has prevailed 
during recent years, not just at the SEC but also in the legislature and the 
judiciary. In some instances, when the Commission has attempted to assert 
regulatory authority over new actors in the market or investment vehicles, 
the courts, interpreting the securities laws narrowly, have voided the SEC’s 
actions.198 Congress too, in the so-called Reform Act of 1995, showed far 
more concern about frivolous law suits than about protecting investors.199
It might also be beneficial for at least one commissioner to be appointed 
from among the ranks of long-term career staff members. This would be a 
strong signal that working at the SEC as a lawyer, economist, or accountant 
can be a career, not just a job before moving on to Wall Street, a law firm or 
a corporation. Despite the staff problems mentioned above and the criticism 
 
The first thing the SEC must do is to recapture its activism of the 1930s 
and 1960s. It must continually keep itself familiar with new types of 
financial instruments and financial entities, if necessary through in-depth 
studies of the particular segments, activities, and actors in the markets. The 
new administration should appoint commissioners who believe that strong 
regulation benefits not only investors but, in the long run, the securities 
industry, the markets, and the economy. Some commissioners might come 
from the ranks of state securities regulators, who seem to have been the 
only persons with anything resembling the regulatory fervor of the early 
days of the Commission. 
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leveled over the Madoff affair, the SEC has always had a tradition of a 
strong, independent-minded staff, sometimes to the chagrin of the 
commissioners. Including a career employee on the Commission would 
create closer ties between the Commission and the staff and help keep the 
Commission more aware of the problems and issues that the staff faces 
every day.200
                                                                                                                 
 200. In the 1960s and 1970s, several career staff members became highly effective 
commissioners; one of them, Manuel Cohen, served as SEC Chairman from 1964 to 1969. In 
recent years a few commissioners, including Harvey Goldschmid and Annette Nazareth, had 
previously served as senior staff members. None of them, however, was a career SEC employee. 
 Furthermore, academics, including William O. Douglas and 
William L. Cary, have been among the most effective past commissioners; 
law and business schools continue to be sources of talent. 
Most important, the SEC must again see itself as the defender of 
investors and a counterweight to securities-industry and corporate lobbyists, 
who have the money, the lawyers, and the political influence to defeat or 
water down regulatory proposals. On the federal level at least, the SEC is 
the investor’s only champion. 
